Security Remediation 2026-05-22

This packet documents the security corrections made after review of the browser voting path, ZK claim boundary, API status, monitoring posture, and REFHE / FHE wording.

1. Commit / Reveal Salt Handling

Finding: the web governance session could persist saltHex inside privatedao-governance-session in localStorage.

Impact: if a page-level XSS, compromised extension, or malicious injected script could read browser storage during the commit window, it could recover the reveal preimage and infer the vote before reveal.

Fix:

• apps/web/src/components/governance-session.tsx now redacts governance state before writing to localStorage.
• saltHex is optional in LiveVoteRuntime, so persisted sessions can keep signatures and commitments without keeping the secret.
• voteChoice is redacted before reveal in persisted storage.
• apps/web/src/components/governance-action-workbench.tsx no longer renders the salt in the DOM.
• The web reveal path now uses an in-memory preimage only. Reloading the tab intentionally discards the salt rather than weakening the privacy boundary.

Tradeoff: the web flow is safer but less forgiving. If the tab is closed or reloaded before reveal, the user must recommit or use the CLI path that stores a local salt file outside browser storage.

2. ZK Claim Boundary

Finding: the homepage could be read as claiming full on-chain ZK verifier enforcement, while the ZK matrix correctly distinguishes live off-chain proofs from future on-chain verifier CPI.

Fix:

• apps/web/src/components/home-shell.tsx now describes ZK as off-chain proof review today across all localized hero copy.
• docs/zk-capability-matrix.md remains the canonical matrix: vote validity, delegation authorization, and tally integrity are live off-chain; on-chain verifier CPI is scheduled for a future protocol phase.
• npm run verify:security-boundaries:2026-05-22 fails if the homepage returns to an unqualified ZK privacy claim.

3. API / Read-Node Status

Concern: public text references api.privatedao.org and /api/v1.

Live check on 2026-05-22:

Fix:

• docs/reviewer-telemetry-packet.generated.md and JSON were rebuilt from current evidence.
• The site should still distinguish api.privatedao.org from same-domain /api/v1 on privatedao.org; static export API routes remain disabled by design.

4. Supabase Browser-Direct Boundary

Current boundary: browser-direct receipts are a continuity layer, not an authoritative server validation layer. The authoritative execution boundary remains the wallet signature and Solana Testnet transaction.

Fix direction now encoded in review surfaces:

• Product copy should not describe browser-direct Supabase writes as server-validated execution.
• Proof pages can show browser receipts beside signatures, but chain signatures remain the verification source.

5. Monitoring

Finding: alert rules exist, live Testnet backend probes now pass, but external alert routing transcripts are still the production-delivery closure item.

Fix:

• docs/monitoring-alert-rules.json keeps the explicit claim boundary: Testnet backend probes are live and verified; external alert routing and incident transcripts remain pending delivery setup.
• docs/monitoring-delivery.generated.md now separates closed Testnet probe requirements from partial transcript-bound alert-delivery requirements.
• npm run verify:security-boundaries:2026-05-22 fails if monitoring is presented as fully production-delivered without external alert evidence.

This is intentionally strict. Live backend probes are evidence; defined alert rules are still not the same thing as completed external alert delivery.

6. REFHE / FHE Boundary

Current implementation: PrivateDAO has REFHE-style confidential settlement envelopes, encrypted payroll proof packets, client-side encryption, and proof-linked receipt surfaces.

Current non-claim: the repo does not claim a fully linked general-purpose FHE runtime library executing arbitrary encrypted treasury logic in production.

Fix:

• Public language should use REFHE / encrypted-operation posture unless a specific runtime proof is present.
• The security boundary verifier keeps ZK and monitoring claims from drifting beyond evidence; REFHE/FHE public copy should follow the same rule.

Verification

Run:

npm run verify:security-boundaries:2026-05-22
npm run verify:reviewer-telemetry-packet
npm run verify:monitoring-delivery
npm --prefix apps/web run lint